According to @deanmlittle, futarchy markets present three payoff cases for traders: buying and the proposal fails makes late buyers exit liquidity for others. Source: @deanmlittle on X, Sep 3, 2025, https://twitter.com/deanmlittle/status/1963090336697536732 According to @deanmlittle, if the proposal passes while the asset trades below NAV, buyers profit as the discount converges to net asset value. Source: @deanmlittle on X, Sep 3, 2025, https://twitter.com/deanmlittle/status/1963090336697536732 According to @deanmlittle, if the proposal passes while trading above NAV, buyers effectively pay a premium to recoup investment, indicating adverse entry pricing. Source: @deanmlittle on X, Sep 3, 2025, https://twitter.com/deanmlittle/status/1963090336697536732 According to @deanmlittle, this framing centers trading decisions on NAV discount or premium relative to pass or fail probabilities in on-chain governance markets, and he asks whether an alternative rational thesis exists. Source: @deanmlittle on X, Sep 3, 2025, https://twitter.com/deanmlittle/status/1963090336697536732

According to @adriannewman21, DATs should price at a discount to spot, or at best at par, because additional layers and opacity versus the underlying asset warrant cheaper pricing for the product (source: @adriannewman21 on X). According to @adriannewman21, this discount dynamic should be especially relevant for BTC and ETH DATs due to access considerations, guiding traders to anchor expectations to spot and anticipate potential NAV discounts (source: @adriannewman21 on X).